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Management Always Wins the Close Ones
Yair Listokin, Yale Law School
While much has been made of “shareholder democracy” as a lever of corporate gover-
nance, there is little evidence about the efficacy of voting. This paper empirically exam-
ines votes on management-sponsored resolutions and finds widespread irregularities
in the distribution of votes received by management. Management is overwhelmingly
more likely to win votes by a small margin than lose by a small margin. The results
indicate that, at some point in the voting process, management obtains highly accurate
information about the likely voting outcome and, based on that information, acts to
influence the vote. The precise point at which this occurs is unclear, though it is likely
to be near the “poll-closing” time. Whatever the cause of management’s advantage, it
is clear that shareholder voting does not constitute a “representative” direct democracy.
(JEL G34, K22, D72)
1. Introduction
Shareholder involvement in corporate decision-making takes two forms.
A shareholder’s primary role is akin to a citizen’s in a republican system
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(Easterbrook and Fischel, 1983). The shareholders choose representatives
(the board of directors), who in turn make most of the decisions (Eule,
1990). On issues of critical importance and issues subject to conflicts of
interest between shareholders and the board, by contrast, shareholder voting
resembles direct democracy (Bebchuk, 2007). For example, shareholders
must directly approve issues such as a sale of the corporation or executive
stock option plans.
Republican policymaking is characterized by “bargain, compromise and
[log]rolling” (Cooter, 1999, pp. 232–3). Those in control of a republican
body, such as a board of directors, can count votes, and therefore almost
never bring to vote an issue that is sure to lose (Riker, 1962;Cooter, 1999;
McCrary, 2007). Direct democracy, by contrast, is harder to control; “the
median [citizen] usually prevails” (Cooter, 1999, p. 232) because contacting
and bargaining with every member of the polity is impossible.
At first glance, direct shareholder voting resembles direct democracy.
Although management gets to choose which proposals come before the
shareholders, the large and uncertain number of shareholder/voters and
management’s inability to bargain with all shareholders should make direct
shareholder votes more difficult to influence than votes in republican set-
tings. Indeed, this is the very purpose of requiring direct shareholder
approval—such votes allow for a “representative” poll of shareholder
sentiment.1
This paper demonstrates that shareholder voting on proposals almost
certainly does not “represent” shareholder opinion in a direct democratic
manner. Instead, shareholder voting outcomes favor management. If voting
were purely representative, then we would expect a continuous distribution
of voting outcomes for two reasons. First, there is considerable uncertainty
in the outcome of a shareholder vote due to the inability to perfectly fore-
cast a disparate shareholder base’s voting decisions and abstention rate;
second, a vote is the cumulative effect of many independent shareholder
decisions—without a coordinator there should be no “jumps” in the distri-
bution of voting (Snyder, 2006).
1. In discussing shareholder approvals, the NYSE writes: “Shareholders’ interest
and participation in corporate affairs has greatly increased. . . . In addition, an increasing
number of important corporate decisions are being referred to shareholders for their
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percentage support received (1% intervals)
Histogram of Vote Percentages for
Management-Sponsored Proposals
Figure 1. All votes presented in figure 1 were decided on the basis of majority
of votes cast or eligible to be cast. Thus, 50 percent means that a
management-sponsored proposal received 50 percent of the votes actually cast on
the issue.
Voting results from the relatively small number of votes on management-
sponsored proposals that are competitive, however, show stark discontinu-
ities. Management-sponsored proposals (the vast majority of which concern
the approval of stock options or other bonus plans) are overwhelmingly more
likely to win a corporate vote by a very small amount than lose by a very
small amount—to a degree that cannot occur by chance. (See figure 1.) For
example, management exceeded its necessary vote requirement by less than
1 percent on fifty-six occasions, while management missed the vote require-
ment by less than 1 percent only eight times. Such a distribution should
occur by chance less than one in one billion times.
These results indicate that shareholder voting on management-sponsored
resolutions does not constitute representative direct democracy. Moreover,
the results are not simply due to quorum requirements and shareholder in-
difference. Management enjoys these stunningly high rates of victory in
elections where the number of votes against the management-sponsored
proposal is extremely high. The results indicate that, at some point in the
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the likely voting outcome and, based on that information, acts to influence
the vote.
The mechanism whereby management obtains accurate information and
seeks to influence the vote is unclear, however. There are several possibilities
but no definitive answer. Information quality should be highest at a point
near the end of the voting. With the polls about to close, management may
apply intense campaigning effort to sway votes and/or adjust poll-closing
times in order to gain victory.
Because the sources of management’s ability to manage close votes are
uncertain, unambiguous policy implications are difficult to state. One point
is clear, however. Direct shareholder voting in corporate law does not provide
the “representative” vote that direct democracy is often intended to provide.
Forcing management to obtain direct shareholder approval is not equivalent
to having citizens vote for or against a referendum.
This paper is related to two distinct literatures. It is part of a growing liter-
ature examining outcome distributions for evidence of irregularities. Snyder,
for example, examines extremely close US House elections (a classic ex-
ample of direct democracy) and finds that incumbents win these elections
much more frequently than they “should” by chance. Wolfers (2006) exam-
ines college basketball teams’ performances with respect to the gambling
“point spread,” and finds that heavy favorites “lose” against the spread more
often than would be expected by chance. McCrary (2007) develops a tool
for measuring discontinuities and examines direct elections and roll call leg-
islative votes, finding no discontinuity in direct elections and considerable
discontinuity in the legislative votes.
The paper also relates to the literature on “shareholder democracy.”
Easterbrook and Fischel (1983) argue that corporate voting places resid-
ual decision-making rights in the hands of those with the greatest eco-
nomic interest in maximizing value—the shareholders. Gilson and Schwartz
(2001) observe that strategic voting may cause shareholder voting to de-
viate from value maximization, and Black and Hu (2006) highlight the
problem of “empty voting,” whereby some shareholders have no economic
interest in a corporation but manage to alter voting outcomes. In a series
of papers, Bebchuk (2005, 2007) advocates enhanced direct shareholder
democracy as a cure for corporate governance ills. The desirability of in-
creased shareholder involvement in corporate decision-making is disputed
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survey the mechanics of corporate voting and address several procedural
concerns. None of these papers examines corporate voting from an empirical
perspective.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the complex
mechanics of shareholder voting. Section 3 develops a simple model of
expected voting outcomes under different conditions. Section 4 presents
summary statistics, while Section 5 presents the data revealing that man-
agement wins a disproportionate number of close votes. Section 6 examines
several potential causes of the discontinuity around 50 percent. Section 7
proposes several policy interventions and concludes.
2. The Mechanics of Voting on Management-Sponsored
Proposals
State law and stock market regulations require direct shareholder votes on
many different issues. These issues include corporate charter amendments,
sales of the corporation, election of directors, and executive compensation.2
Different issues must meet different voting thresholds for approval. For ex-
ample, Delaware corporate default law requires the approval of a majority
of shares outstanding in order to change a corporation’s charter. By con-
trast, a proposal to alter an executive compensation plan becomes effective
when it is approved by a majority of votes cast.3 Since there are more
shares outstanding than votes cast—some shares are not voted in every
election—the majority of shares outstanding threshold is typically harder
to achieve. Some companies change the default law to require two-thirds
or even 80 percent supermajorities for a proposal to pass. These changes
overwhelmingly occur when the “voting population” is the number of shares
outstanding. Companies also divide in their treatment of abstaining votes.
Some count abstentions as votes against, while others do not.
Conducting a vote on a management-sponsored resolution, such as one
mandated by NYSE and NASDAQ rules for approval of executive or director
2. See DGCL § 242(b)(1) (charter amendments); DGCL § 251(c) (mergers); DGCL
§ 271(a) (asset sales) DGCL § 216(2) (Other matters). NYSE Listed Company Manual
Section 303A(8) (stock option plans).
3. See DGCL § 242(b)(1) (charter amendments); DGCL § 251(c) (mergers); DGCL
§ 271(a) (asset sales) DGCL § 216(2) (Other matters), NYSE Listed Company Manual
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stock option plans, is not a straightforward task. Most beneficial owners of
a company are not registered owners (Wilcox & Purcell, 2004). Instead, the
registered owner is typically the Depository Trust Corporation (DTC), which
owns shares under the name of “Cede & Co.” In turn, the DTC holds stock
in accounts for its “participants,” which include large banks and brokerage
firms. Beneficial owners typically arrange for the purchase of shares through
these participants. Thus, there are at least two levels of intermediaries (the
DTC and the brokerage or the bank) between the beneficial owner and
the corporation. This structure facilitates record-keeping and clearing, and
minimizes the transaction costs of exchanging stocks (Wilcox and Purcell,
2004).
The structure complicates the process of allowing beneficial owners to
vote their shares, however. When management wants to alter a stock op-
tion plan, it will typically attempt to canvass the beneficial shareholders,
often by hiring a proxy solicitation firm, before submitting the proposal.
Management cannot obtain a precise measure of the likely vote outcome
at this stage, but it can get a sense of whether there is significant oppo-
sition to a proposal (Wilcox, 2006). If management gets the sense that
it cannot win the proposal, it will often withdraw or alter the proposal
(Roiter, 2006). If management is confident that it will win or strongly de-
sires the proposal in spite of significant beneficial owner opposition, it
will typically submit a definitive proxy proposal 30 days before an actual
vote.
Of course, the registered owner of most of the corporation’s shares is the
DTC. When a proxy proposal comes to the DTC, it delegates its voting rights
by submitting an omnibus proxy for all of its shares in a single corporation
to its participant banks and brokerages. The banks and brokerages are then
in charge of ensuring that the interests of the beneficial owners are followed.
Frequently, the banks and brokerages hire Broadridge’s Investor Communi-
cation Division (formerly a unit of ADP Inc.) to administer the process of
distributing the proxy materials and tabulating the beneficial owner’s votes.
Broadridge tabulates all the votes it receives and gives a running count of
the vote totals, broken down by the bank or the brokerage rather than by the
beneficial owner, to the tabulator, who is an agent of management. The votes
typically come in two waves, one when the proxy materials are sent out,
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3. A Model of Corporate Voting Outcomes
To fix ideas about the expected vote distribution that will be observed
given the voting mechanics described above, this section develops a simple
mathematical framework of voting when management can choose issues for
voting and expend time and money influencing the vote.
Assume that management values the passage of a proposal at WM . If no
proposal is passed, management gets no utility. Proposals pass if they get
more than 50 percent of the votes cast, and fail otherwise.
Any proposal has a continuously distributed initial level of (underlying)
support θ ∈ [0, 1].
Management can attempt to convince voters to change their votes by in-
curring cost c, and expenditures change preferences according to v(c), where
v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0 and that v (∞) < 1 − θ—high expenditures will never
enable management to gain all shareholder votes. Posteffort level of support
is thus θ + v(c).4 The assumption that management can influence votes but
managerial opponents cannot pushes the results in favor of management. If
neither side could influence the vote or if both sides had offsetting influence,
then the predicted distribution of voting outcomes would be less favorable
for management.
Management gets a single noisy signal, θM = θ + ε of the underlying
support for the vote, where ε has a c.d.f of F (·) and a p.d.f. of f (·).5
Management first chooses whether to conduct a vote on a proposal.6
Assume that if management is indifferent between conducting a vote and
not conducting a vote, then it will not conduct a vote. Thus, management’s
minimum expected utility is 0.
4. I make the assumption that θ and v(c) are additively separable for expositional
convenience. The restrictions on the outcomes of v() make this assumption possible. Note
that this corresponds to a game wherein management has the last move and therefore
seeks to attain the minimum level of support, in contrast to Groseclose and Snyder
(1996), wherein the player exerting effort is not the final mover.
5. Management could get multiple signals at different stages, of course. The con-
clusions about the importance of the quality of the signal for the continuity of the observed
vote distribution would be unchanged by this alternative, however.
6. Management thus has two advantages. It can influence votes and it can choose
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U = WM ∗ Pr(vote>0.5) − c
= max
c
WM ∗ Pr(θM − ε + v(c) > 0.5) − c
= max
c
WM ∗ F (θM + v(c) − 0.5) − c
U ≥ 0. (1)
Before solving this maximization, it is useful to consider some extreme
cases to fix ideas. First, assume no uncertainty, θM = θ. This corresponds
to an extreme form of small group voting and horse-trading, where there is
no uncertainty about anyone’s vote, enabling management to choose voting
issues perfectly. In this case, management exerts no effort if θM > 0.5—it
is guaranteed to win without exerting any costly effort. If θM < 0.5, then
if WM > c∗, management chooses c∗ where v(c∗) + θM = 0.5. Otherwise
management chooses no effort, and therefore does not bring the issue to a
vote.
Perfect management information about voting intentions would yield the
following distribution of voting outcomes. There would be no management
losses. Anytime θM < 0.5, management would either not hold a vote or
would expend effort c∗ to enable a victory. There would be a large number
of votes at or just above 0.5, representing all votes that had an underlying
support level of 0.5 and all votes that had a lower initial support level,
but in which management exerted the necessary effort to attain a narrow
victory, creating a discontinuity at 0.5. Finally there would be a continuous
distribution of votes well above 0.5, as management exerts no effort to
win in these cases, so the distribution of observed votes is the same as
the continuously distributed underlying level of support. This predicted
voting outcome distribution is similar to outcome distributions observed in
legislative roll call elections (McCrary, 2007).7
Adding uncertainty changes the predicted distribution of observed vote
outcomes. Solving equation (1) with respect to c yields the following
7. Note, however, that there are comparatively few roll call votes that get the
minimum majority necessary (Koehler, 1975). Koehler notes that uncertainty about par-
ticipation rates in legislative contexts induces agenda setters to obtain a coalition that is
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first-order condition:8
WM [v
′(c) f (θM + v(c) − 0.5)] = 1. (2)
Intuitively, management exerts effort until the marginal value of that effort,
represented by the value of a victory to management times the increase in
probability associated with a small change in effort, equals the marginal cost
of effort.
Now consider the other extreme, of complete uncertainty, with manage-
ment’s signal yielding no information about likely voting outcomes. This
corresponds to a direct democracy where no party can choose the timing of
votes. For example, suppose that ε is uniformly distributed between −θ and
1 − θ, making θM a useless signal because it yields no information about θ.
In this case, management exerts the same effort, ĉ(where ĉ solves equation
(2), in all cases that it brings to a vote.9 Because it does not receive a valu-
able signal about potential voting plans, management cannot tailor its effort
to the amount of underlying support. Therefore, management will treat all
issues coming to a vote in the same manner. Under these conditions, there
will be no discontinuities in the distribution of observed voting outcomes.
The vote distribution in this case will reflect the distribution of underlying
support θ, but will be skewed to the right by v(ĉ). Because θ is continuously
distributed, the voting outcome distribution will also be continuously dis-
tributed around 0.5. The continuity of the distribution around 0.5 reflects
management’s poor information. Without knowing how many votes it will
get, management cannot control the issues brought to a vote perfectly, nor
can management perfectly tailor its efforts to influence votes.
The observed voting distribution thus depends on the quality of manage-
ment’s information. If this information is perfect at the time management
chooses votes or at the time management exerts effort to influence votes,
then there should be a sharp discontinuity in the number of votes around 0.5.
With no information, the distribution of votes around 0.5 should reflect the
distribution of underlying support θ at less than 0.5 (because management
8. For simplicity, I assume a unique solution. If the solution to the first-order
condition yields negative utility, then there will be no vote.
9. If losing a vote has no costs, management will bring all issues to a vote, though it
will not exert effort in all votes. If losing a vote has a cost, then management will choose
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effort moves underlying support from less than 0.5 to the neighborhood of
0.5). The distribution of votes with underlying support less than 0.5 is con-
tinuous and is also unlikely to exhibit any sharp fluctuations because it is the
product of uncoordinated decisions of many different shareholders. When
management has valuable but imperfect information, the observed voting
distribution should begin to exhibit increasing discontinuity at 0.5, with
the “sharpness” of the discontinuity related to the quality of management’s
information.
The paper now explores actual vote outcomes to determine how they
compare with these predictions.
4. Data and Summary Statistics
The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) collected data on
corporate votes on shareholder proposals sponsored by management or other
parties from 1997 through 2004.10 The collected votes occurred in over
2,700 different companies, including all companies in the Fortune 500 and
S&P 500. After inspecting the data to make sure that the sponsor of each
resolution could be identified and that no votes were double counted,11 there
are 13,360 unique votes on management-sponsored proposals and 2,759
votes on shareholder-sponsored proposals. From 1997 to 2000, there were
approximately 2,000 unique votes on management-sponsored resolutions
per year. This number dropped each year between 2001 and 2004. In 2004,
there were only 1,152 votes on management-sponsored resolutions. This
decrease may reflect the fact that it was more difficult for management to
get resolutions passed in the post-Enron, post-Internet bubble environment.
The most common management-sponsored proposals (see table 1) con-
cerned stock option plans for executives and directors (Martin and Thomas,
2005). Proposals to adopt or amend stock incentive plans or bonus plans
10. For 1991–1996 and 2005, the IRRC collected data on shareholder proposals,
but not management-sponsored proposals.
11. Observations with missing values for the sponsor of the resolution were dropped.
In addition, when multiple proposals (such as stock option plan approvals for both ex-
ecutives and for directors) are decided by one vote, the vote is associated with the more
common issue. For example, if one vote was used to approve an executive stock option
plan and a director stock option plan, then that vote was treated as a single vote on an
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votes of given type
Relating to that pass if they
Specific executive or board Number of Percentage receive a majority








Yes 1,901 14.2% 97%
Approve bonus
plan
Yes 880 6.6% 98%
Increase common
stock




Maybe 1,249 9.3% 98%
Approve merger
or acquisition
No 838 6.3% 23%




All proposals 13,360 100% 75%
This table presents data from the IRRC on the most common types of management-sponsored proposals in
the sample. The table indicates that proposals that are either certainly or potentially related to managerial or
board compensation are, by a large margin, the most common type of management-sponsored proposals. The
compensation approval issues require a majority of ballots cast, rather than a majority of shares outstanding, in
order to pass. Note that this table presents data on proposals and not unique votes—in some cases two related
proposals, such as new executive and director option or bonus plans, may be combined into one vote.
for management or directors constituted approximately 52 percent of the
management-sponsored proposals. These issues overwhelmingly require a
majority of ballots cast (their “voting population” is the number of ballots
cast), rather than a majority of shares outstanding, in order to pass. Other
common management-sponsored proposals were proposals to increase the
amount of authorized common stock (1,625 proposals, 12.2 percent of the
sample) (sometimes necessary for executive bonus plans), adopt or extend an
employee stock purchase plan (1,249 proposals, 9.3 percent of the sample),
approve a merger or acquisition (838 proposals, 6.3 percent of the sam-
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Table 2. Average votes for proposals by voting requirement and proposal type
Votes Votes
Management- for against
sponsored Voting proposal proposal Abstentions
resolutions population Statistic (%) (%) (%)
Ballots cast Mean 85.2 14.1 1.1
SD 13.1 12.9 2.2
N 9948 9927 5952
Shares Mean 74.8 6.7 0.69
outstanding
SD 12.3 8.8 1.9
N 2969 2919 2806
Total Mean 82.8 12.4 0.98
SD 13.6 12.5 2.1




Ballots cast Mean 31.8 68.0 2.0
SD 22.6 22.7 1.9
N 2723 2722 187
This table presents mean percentage, standard deviation, and number of observations for the number of votes
for, votes against, and abstentions from proposals in the sample. These statistics are displayed for all the
management-sponsored votes in the data set in the total row, and for two different voting population groups
(voting population of ballots cast and voting population of shares outstanding) in the other rows. Votes counted
as percentages of shares outstanding for shareholder resolutions are not included because there are less than
20 such votes in the data set. All the percentages are calculated using the appropriate denominator (counting
or not counting abstentions and nonvotes). This provides a partial explanation for the large number of missing
observations in the abstentions category—for some of the proposals decided by simple majority, abstentions are
simply not counted as part of the voting population.
require a majority of shares outstanding in order to carry. Sometimes these
issues even require supermajorities of shares outstanding for passage.
Table 2 presents mean voting outcomes for the entire sample as well
as selected subgroups. The mean management proposal in the data set re-
ceived approximately 83 percent of the votes in favor, 12 percent of the
votes against, and about 1 percent abstentions. These numbers do not sum
to 100 percent because some votes are counted as a percentage of outstand-
ing shares.12 When the sample is divided by voting population, the mean
management proposal gets about 85 percent favorable votes, 14 percent neg-
ative votes, and 1 percent abstentions if the voting population is votes cast.
12. Nonvotes and abstentions constitute different categories. Nonvotes are shares
that never submitted proxies, while abstentions are shares that submitted proxies but
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When the voting population is shares outstanding, the mean management
proposal gets approximately 75 percent of the votes, with about 7 percent
of ballots cast against the proposal and a negligible number of abstentions.
Not surprisingly, the mean favorable percentage for management-sponsored
amendments is lower when the voting population is the number of shares
outstanding—the voting population is larger when it includes all shares
outstanding, making it more difficult to garner a high percentage of posi-
tive votes. Shareholder-sponsored resolutions receive lower average support
(31.8 percent) than management-sponsored proposals.
Although management-sponsored proposals typically pass easily, they
do not always do so. About 6.5 percent of the management-sponsored res-
olutions in which the voting population is the ballots cast, and 11 percent
of the management-sponsored resolutions in which the voting population is
the total shares outstanding, become close votes, where close is defined by
winning or losing by less than 10 percentage points from the cutoff point.
The vast majority (over 94 percent) of these close votes concern executive
or director stock option plans.
Close votes are not randomly distributed across companies. The first
row of table 3 demonstrates that small companies, companies with lower
governance indexes (i.e., better governed companies) (Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2004), and companies with
relatively high levels of institutional ownership are more likely to have a
close vote than other companies.13
The next section examines these close votes in more detail. Figure 1 and
subsequent data analysis include close votes on all management-sponsored
resolutions. As noted, the large majority of these close votes concern com-
pensation plans. Close votes on management-sponsored resolutions have
different meanings depending on a company’s voting requirement. Figure 1
and subsequent analysis focuses exclusively on cases where the voting pop-
ulation is votes cast to examine issues where there is substantial shareholder
opposition to a management proposal, rather than simply a lack of interest
13. Even though a company with below median levels of institutional ownership is
more likely to have a close vote than a company with above median levels, the average
level of institutional ownership for firms that have close votes is higher than the average
level of institutional ownership for the entire sample. If a firm has unusually high amounts
of institutional ownership (in the top 10 percent of the distribution), it is more likely to
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Table 3. Close vote frequencies and firm characteristics: summary statistics
% Institutional

































10 4 12 2 8 6
This table exhibits the number and outcome of “close votes” disaggregated by particular firm characteristics.
All votes in the table are decided by majority of actual votes. The governance index (G) by Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick has a median of approximately 9, the table indicating that firms with a below median G (better governed
firms) have more close votes, and tend to lose close votes relatively more often than firms with a high G. Results
change little when the E index proposed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) is used in place of the G index.
Smaller firms have more close votes and lose close votes more often than large companies. Firms with high
levels of institutional ownership have more close votes and lose close votes more frequently, than firms with
lower levels of institutional ownership.
(as might be the case when the voting population is total shares outstanding).
Because supermajority requirements typically use shares outstanding as the
voting population, votes requiring supermajorities are excluded from most
of the results presented below.
5. Outcomes of Close Votes
Figure 1 displays a histogram of the number of votes for management-
sponsored proposals decided by a simple majority of votes cast. Figure 1
shows a pronounced discontinuity at the 50 percent mark—which is the
minimum needed for a management-sponsored proposal to pass. There are
many votes receiving greater than 50 percent and very few votes less than
50 percent. There are more votes that receive between 50 and 53 percent of
the votes than votes that receive between 0 and 50 percent of the votes. While
there are 56 votes that receive between 50 and 51 percent of the votes, there
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at 50 percent persists even for intervals of smaller than 1 percent, with
26 votes receiving support levels between 50 and 50.5 percent, while only
3 votes receive support between 49.5 and 50 percent. Other than around
50 percent, there are no obvious discontinuities.
Using the caliper test suggested by Gerber and Malhotra (2006), the
probability of such a discontinuity occurring can be roughly estimated.14
The caliper test assumes that the underlying distribution of voting outcomes
can be modeled using the distribution of voting outcomes between 53 and
70 percent. Thus, the test examines the null hypothesis that there is no
discontinuity at 50 percent, given that the distribution at 50 percent comes
from the same underlying distribution function as the distribution of votes
between 53 and 70 percent. The caliper test indicates that the probability of
getting the observed 22 votes that receive between 47 and 50 percent support
and 167 votes between 50 and 53 percent, given that no discontinuities exist
at 50 percent is less than one in one billion. Clearly, there is a nonrandom
discontinuity in the data around 50 percent. Management-sponsored pro-
posals get just over 50 percent support far more often than they “should”
and get just under 50 percent support far less often than they should.
Note that all of the proposals in figure 1 are decided by simple majority
rules. Therefore the discontinuity cannot be due to the fact that management
gets to a certain level and stops pursuing votes. This strategy works when
the voting population has a fixed size (e.g., the proposal requires a majority
of total shares outstanding rather than a majority of total votes cast, and
management stops when it gets the votes of more than half the shares).
14. In the limit as the size of an interval goes to zero, the probability of an observation
falling on one half of the interval or another is binomially distributed with probability of
0.5. In larger intervals, the curvature of the density function can affect the probability of
falling into an interval. To adjust for the curvature of the density function, the probability
was estimated as follows. First, I obtain a predicted number of votes that should fall within
any specified interval near 50 by regressing the number of votes in a given interval on the
level of support for intervals of 1 percent between 53 and 70 percent. fi = α + βpi + εi
(a linear approximation of the density function), where fi is the frequency of votes within
interval i, pi is the value of the lower bound of the interval i, and εi is an error term. (This
assumes that the vote frequencies between 53 and 70 percent can predict the underlying
vote preferences for votes closer to 50.) Then I obtain predicted probability (q) of having
a vote in the interval (50 − x, 50), given that there is a vote in the interval (50 − x, 50 + x),
which is q = f̂ 50−x,50 /( ˆ̂f 50−x,50 + f̂ 50,50+x ). This adjusts for the curvature of the density
function in the interval under study. The probability of getting m votes in the interval
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Histogram of Vote Percentages for
Shareholder-Sponsored Proposals
Figure 2. Figure presents the number of shareholder sponsored proposals
receiving different levels of support. Shareholder sponsored proposals are
precatory. Management does not have to implement the directions of a
shareholder resolution that receives more than 50%.
When the voting population is the number of votes cast, however, there will
be uncertainty about how many votes are needed because the voting popula-
tion is itself uncertain. As a result, management does not have a clear target
beyond which it can stop seeking votes. Indeed, in almost all of the nar-
row management victories, the number of votes supporting management’s
proposal falls short of a majority of the shares outstanding.
Evidence from shareholder-sponsored resolutions suggests that the dis-
continuity at 50 percent is not the result of a strangely shaped distribution of
underlying shareholder support at 50 percent. If shareholder preferences are
discontinuous at 50 percent, we would expect them to be discontinuous for
shareholder-sponsored resolutions in addition to management-sponsored
resolutions. Alternatively, if management efforts to win management-
sponsored resolutions are what is causing the discontinuity, then we would
expect shareholder resolutions to exhibit no discontinuity at 50 percent be-
cause the vast majority of shareholder-sponsored resolutions are precatory;
if getting more than 50 percent means nothing, then we would expect no
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Log of market value 0.234∗∗∗
(0.0649)
[0.033]




Results of logit regression with management victory in a close election as the dependent variable. Standard
errors in parentheses. Marginal effects, when other values are at their mean, in brackets.
∗∗∗significant at 1% level.
is no discontinuity around 50 percent that cannot be attributed to chance.
This suggests that the discontinuity around 50 percent for management-
sponsored proposals is caused by specific behaviors associated with the fact
that 50 percent is the minimum support necessary for the passage of most
management-sponsored proposals.
6. What is Causing the Discontinuity?
6.1. Disproportionate Success Rates and Corporate Characteristics
Figure 1 demonstrates that there is a discontinuity in the distribution of
voting outcomes in management-sponsored votes at 50 percent. This section
discusses possible causes of the discontinuity.
One means of investigating the causes of the discontinuity is to define the
features that make a company more or less likely to win a disproportionate
number of close votes. To examine this question, table 4 presents results from
the following logit regression of “close” votes where management received
between 40 and 60 percent support for a management-sponsoredproposal,
Pr(yi = 1 | 40% < yi j < 60%) = F(X ′iβ)
where yi is a dummy variable, indicating whether or not a management-
sponsored proposal at company i passed and Xi is a vector of variables that
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governance index for company i, the size of company i, and the percentage
of company i owned by institutional investors, and F is the logit function.
The logit regression results presented in table 4 show that better gov-
ernance is not associated with lower management success rates in close
elections. Well-governed companies are no more likely to lose close votes
than other companies (the coefficient and the marginal effect of a change in
governance index is practically and statistically insignificant, as is the effect
of an increase in institutional investors.) This suggests that corporate gover-
nance interventions have no impact on managerial incentives or managerial
ability to influence close voting outcomes. In addition, having more institu-
tional investors as a percentage of shareholders has no impact on the ability
of management to win close votes. This is somewhat surprising. One would
have thought that information quality would be higher the greater the per-
centage of institutional investors. Finally, larger companies are significantly
more likely to win a disproportionate number of close votes than smaller
companies. If large companies are more sophisticated than small compa-
nies and can hire more sophisticated proxy solicitors, then their ability to
influence close votes should be higher.
The regression results suggest that sophistication (proxied by size) is
related to management’s ability to disproportionately win close votes, but
otherwise does not provide any conclusive evidence concerning the causes
of the discontinuity around 50 percent. Furthermore, the discontinuity is
so large that even small companies win a disproportionate number of close
votes. The mathematical framework developed above yields some insights
into necessary factors for creating the pronounced discontinuity in voting
outcomes observed around 50 percent.
6.2. Discontinuous Distributions of Voting Outcomes and
Information Quality
The sharpness of the discontinuity at 50 percent strongly suggests that
management has extremely accurate information about the outcome of vot-
ing at a time when management can do something to put off or change the
outcome of some votes headed in an undesirable direction. If the quality
of management’s information was imperfect, then it should not be good
enough at identifying bad outcomes to maintain a sharp discontinuity. The
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between 49.5 and 50 percent suggests the availability of information that is
accurate to within 1 percentage point.
The distribution of voting outcomes does not correspond flawlessly to the
perfect information model developed earlier, however. With perfect informa-
tion, there should be a large number of votes that receive just over 50 percent
support; because it costly to shift votes, managers should always stop at just
over 50 percent whenever they need to exert effort to gain passage. Figure 1
shows, however, that while just over 50 percent has many more votes than
just under 50 percent, there are still more votes with a few percentage points
over 50 percent and even more votes a few percentage points above that. In
other words, management is not able to observe a perfect signal about all
votes and then turn all votes headed for a loss into a narrow win.
In total, the voting outcome distribution is consistent with the following
model. Management receives a noisy signal about the likely outcome of a
resolution before bringing the issue for a vote. It brings likely successes for-
ward and shuns likely failures. This explains the preponderance of votes that
receive overwhelming management support. Sometimes, however, manage-
ment reads its shareholders poorly or chooses to bring a borderline issue to
vote. On this relatively scarce subset of management-sponsored proposals,
management receives high-quality information about likely voting outcomes
at a point at which management can still influence the voting process.
Conventional wisdom suggests that management’s information about
likely voting outcomes is unlikely to be very precise at early stages of
the shareholder voting process for several reasons. First, with most votes
submitted at a late date (or even the last day or hour) and many man-
agers refusing to reveal their intended vote direction (Wilcox, 2006), the
precise outcome of votes should be in doubt until near the end of the bal-
loting process. The well-known proxy contest at Hewlett Packard concern-
ing HP’s proposed merger/acquisition of Compaq provides support for the
conventional wisdom.15 In the week before the proxy contest vote ended,
HP took “extraordinary measures” to sway the vote of shares in HP held by
Deutsche Bank, measures that ultimately provoked contentious litigation.16
15. For a summary of this protracted proxy contest and merger, see Ian Fried,
HP closes book on Compaq deal, CNET, May 2 2002, available at http://builder-
news.com.com/2100–1001-898887.html.
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And yet Deutsche Bank’s votes ultimately proved unnecessary for HP’s
victory.17 The fact that HP took such risks suggests that management has
real uncertainties about the outcome of some contentious votes a matter of
days before the polls close.
Second, there is uncertainty introduced by the highly imperfect counting
and aggregation procedures used in corporate voting (Kahan and Rock,
2008). Share lending and short selling, for example, often cause multiple
parties to believe that they are entitled to vote on an issue. In some cases,
more votes are cast than shares outstanding.18 As one scholar has observed,
“[C]orporate voting does not work. . . Some shareholders’ votes are counted;
others are not” (Partnoy, 2006). These opinions are echoed by a Delaware
corporate lawyer, who notes that in a contest that is closer than 55–45
percent, there is no verifiable answer to the question “who won?” (Kahan
and Rock, 2008).
The sharpness of the discontinuity presented in figure 1 suggests either
that the conventional wisdom discussed here is wrong and that management
has high-quality information at an early stage of the voting process, or that
management is able to affect the outcome of some votes after the uncertainty
described here has been resolved.
6.3. Methods of Winning Close Contests after Receiving
High-Quality Information about Likely Outcomes
The remainder of this section supposes that the conventional wisdom
about the quality of management’s signal well before the election is true and
investigates means by which management might avoid losses at a very late
point in the voting process (such as the day on which the vote is supposed
to end).
Management enjoys access to real-time voting information. Even if the
decisions about which votes to count and not to count made by Broadridge
are arbitrary, management knows the outcome of these arbitrary decisions.
If the resolution is not the subject of a proxy fight, by contrast, than any
opponents to management do not have access to the same information.
Therefore, management enjoys superior information about the voting results
17. Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2002 WL 818091 (Del.Ch. 2002).
18. See NYSE Information Memo 04–58, “Supervision of Proxy Activities and
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Table 5. Voting outcomes and stock exchange rules re: broker voting
Executive compensation votes (broker votes permitted
before June 30, 2003, prohibited afterwards)
Through June 30, 2003 After June 30, 2003
Close wins for management
(50–53 percent support)
51 10
Close losses for management
(47–50 percent support)
6 1
This table divides the management-sponsored proposals sample into two separate time periods. The first time
period consists of all votes that took place before June 30, 2003, in which brokers could vote the shares of
individuals who had failed to signal a voting preference. This policy was changed after June 30, 2003.
on the day at which voting comes to an end (when the amount of uncertainty
is the lowest). If management is just slightly behind as the voting nears an
end, it can campaign heavily to eke out a victory.
One potential source of last-minute votes may be “broker voting.” Before
a rule change in mid-2003, brokers were allowed to vote the shares of some
beneficial owners for some management-sponsored resolutions whenever
the beneficial owner failed to inform the broker of the shareholder’s desired
vote within 10 days of the voting date (Bethel and Gillan, 2002). Because the
vast majority of broker votes are cast in management’s favor, broker voting
of undirected shares may account for some of the voting discontinuity at
50 percent. If management only sought as many broker votes as needed to
garner a victory, then management could “call in” broker nonvotes at the
last minute in order to sway the outcome.
Broker voting cannot be the only source of “last-minute” votes, however.
If broker nonvotes were causing the discontinuity, then we would expect
management’s success rate in close elections to decline after the rules were
changed in 2003 to prohibit broker voting on many types of executive com-
pensation plans. Table 5 suggests that broker nonvoting is not the primary
cause of management’s high success rates—management’s high success
rates continued even after the exclusion of broker nonvotes– though small
sample concerns preclude confident conclusions.
If last-minute campaigning does not succeed, management may try other
techniques. For example, management may simply adjust the poll-closing
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time.19 Instead, the closing time for the polls is fixed by the vote tabulator.
This gives the vote tabulator (typically an agent of management) the ability
to keep the polls open for slightly longer (and campaign) if management is
behind or to close the polls earlier than the usual time if management is just
ahead. If altering closing times does not suffice, management may seek to
adjourn a vote it is about to lose to a different day.
Delaware courts have suggested that altering poll-closing times to ensure
victory may be a breach of fiduciary duty. In SWIB, the management of the
Peerless Corporation adjourned a close vote on the issuance of new stock
related to an executive stock option plan when it appeared that the proposal
was about to lose.20 Management then campaigned over the adjournment
period by contacting shareholders likely to vote management’s way, and
subsequently won the vote. In a shareholder suit, the Delaware Chancery
suggested that these actions “frustrated the shareholder franchise” and that it
was a breach of management’s fiduciary duty absent compelling justification.
If this behavior is a breach of fiduciary duty, then more nefarious tactics that
might be used by management to “eke” out a last-minute victory, such as
selective vote counting or vote buying, would also be a breach of fiduciary
duty.
7. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
There are relatively few close votes on management-sponsored resolu-
tions, but management wins a disproportionate number of the extremely
close votes that do occur. The best explanation for this distribution of out-
comes is that management first receives a noisy signal about the likely
outcome of a resolution, bringing likely successes forward and avoiding
likely failures. When management brings a borderline issue to a vote, it
receives high-quality information about likely voting outcomes at a point at
which it can influence the voting process.
Policy conclusions depend upon one’s view of this state of affairs. If
one views shareholders as akin to legislative actors, then the discontinuity
19. See DGCL Section 231.
20. State of Wisconsin Investment Board (“SWIB”) v. Peerless Systems Corp., 2000
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found here may be unobjectionable.21 Management “controls” shareholder
voting in much the same way as governing leaders control a legislature.
When a vote is close, management uses its superior information, ability to
time votes, and ability to “logroll” to obtain the votes it needs. This does
not make shareholder voting useless, because issues that are particularly
noxious to shareholders may never be proposed when approval is required;
management is only able to “influence” the marginal issues. In total, few
policy changes are warranted if shareholder voting is intended to resemble
legislative voting.
The discontinuity at 50 percent belies the notion that shareholder voting
is a direct democracy that collects the unvarnished opinion of the share-
holders. Resolutions that management strongly prefers but that shareholders
slightly dislike are likely to be approved. Moreover, management’s ability
to sway close votes may discourage opponents to a management-sponsored
resolution from coming forward because prospective opponents know that
they are likely to lose anything close. Thus, management’s ability to sway
close votes may have a greater impact than the few close votes that are
actually swayed, much as legislative leaders’ agenda control discourages
many forms of opposition.
Therefore, if the goal of shareholder voting is to obtain a representative
vote of shareholders via direct democracy, then the discontinuity at 50
percent appears to justify several policy changes. First, the poll-closing
discretion allowed in Delaware Corporate Law should be eliminated. There
is no way to obtain a vote that truly reflects the will of the shareholders if one
side can decide to close or keep open the polls in a self-interested fashion.
Poll-closing times should be announced when a vote is announced—and
adjournments should be granted only for good cause.
Second, management’s ability to obtain accurate information while vot-
ing is still occurring should be stopped because it gives management an
important advantage relative to opponents of a resolution. The status quo
allows management to obtain frequent vote updates, while shareholder op-
ponents of management often have no comparable knowledge. This allows
21. Some behaviors and outcomes are objectionable in a legislative context as well as
a direct democratic context. For example, legislative leaders may not offer to directly buy
the votes of other legislators. Similarly, some management behavior should be prohibited











182 American Law and Economics Review V10 N2 2008 (159–184)
management to win votes when underlying shareholder preferences are
against a proposal because management can tailor its expenditures as needed;
if management sees that it is well behind, it can undertake an extraordinary
effort, while its opponents have no obvious way of responding. This dis-
courages opponents from campaigning. If official voting information was
only disclosed after polls close—as occurs in democratic elections—then
potential opponents might choose to campaign, knowing that management
will not always be able to “pull it out.” Such campaigning may have con-
siderable value in a direct democratic context because it provides additional
information to the shareholder voting pool.
A third desirable policy change—the introduction of transparent counting
procedures—may be desirable regardless of whether or not one believes that
shareholder voting correlates with direct democracy. There is no evidence
that vote counters miscount, but the existence of a discontinuity near 50
percent and management’s relationship to vote tabulators may cast unfair
aspersions on the integrity of the voting process and the authority of man-
agement. State default rules requiring that an independent firm count and
inspect votes may therefore be justified.22
Finally, it should be emphasized that this paper concerns a subset of share-
holder voting—voting on management-sponsored resolutions and share-
holder resolutions. In future work, I hope to explore proxy contests for
director elections, another important dimension of shareholder voting.
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